Quadratic Voting and Member Voice in DC Pension Schemes: An Equitable Governance Response

Abstract The transition from Defined Benefit (DB) to Defined Contribution (DC) pension schemes has transferred substantial investment risk from employers to members while leaving governance largely with trustees and investment managers. Most occupational pension scheme (OPS) members nevertheless remain passive because of financial illiteracy, behavioural biases and reliance on default investment arrangements. This article examines whether contemporary DC pension governance adequately reflects members’ interests and proposes Quadratic Voting (QV) as a mechanism for improving member participation. QV captures preference intensity through a quadratic allocation of voting credits, rather than treating all preferences as equal. The legal basis for member voice lies not in direct ownership of pension assets, but in members’ beneficial interests, rights to due administration and status as non-volunteer beneficiaries within a fiduciary structure. Properly designed as an advisory mechanism, QV gives trustees structured evidence of member preferences without displacing fiduciary discretion or undermining trustees’ legal duties.