Why Death Is Not Necessarily Most in One's Self‐Interest: A Reply to Kriska

In this response, I examine Victor Kriska's defense of thanatism, the claim that a quick and painless death is necessarily most in one's self-interest, and its stronger extension to all possible lives. I argue that Kriska's conclusion does not follow. The principles on which Kriska's argument relies are internally ambiguous. Once disambiguated, these principles either fail to support thanatism or require unpromising theoretical commitments. My criticism goes further. Even if these internal difficulties are somehow resolvable, Kriska's central principle of self-interest lacks independent justification. Without an adequate rationale, it assigns much weight to the minimization of bad while systematically subordinating the minimization of good. In conclusion, Kriska offers only controversial and under-motivated principles of self-interest rather than a compelling case for thanatism.