What does it mean to be a post‐Newtonian? Schelling on competing scientific models

Abstract While Schelling's position has often been portrayed as highly critical of Newton, his discussion of Newton's theories has never been thoroughly studied. The goal of this paper is to analyze in more detail the relationship between Schelling and Newton, with an eye toward the fundamental question that guides Schelling: how can conflicts between competing sciences or competing scientific models be solved, or in this case, how can the Newtonian system be true only to some extent? I show that Schelling was not so hostile toward Newton as is usually acknowledged and that it is important to distinguish different chronological steps, as well as a significant difference between his accounts of the Principia and of the Optics . I underline that Schelling did not take the theory of universal gravitation to be a model for other sciences but tried to reconcile it with other competing and seemingly contradictory accounts of nature. Finally, I suggest that such clarification brings new light to the complex project of a “philosophy of nature” advocated by Schelling, especially in that it helps to understand Schelling's focus on a unified conception of science.