Fair division with binary valuations: Characterizations
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible goods with binary valuations. In this setting, the maximum Nash welfare rule, the leximin rule, and all additive welfarist rules with a strictly concave function coincide. We show that for any number of agents, this rule is the only rule that satisfies envy-freeness up to one good, strategyproofness, neutrality, minimal completeness, and invariance under disapproving unassigned goods (IDU). Moreover, we present an alternative characterization for two agents, where we replace IDU with non-redundancy and resource-monotonicity. In both characterizations, all axioms are necessary.
Authors
- Nicholas Teh (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9698-466X)
- Florian Brandl (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3931-3931)
- Warut Suksompong (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8973-2539)
Institutions
- University of Bonn (DE)
- National University of Singapore (SG)
- University of Oxford (GB)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Social Choice and Welfare
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-026-01685-3
- Citations
- 5
- Primary Topic
- Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 14.69
Funders
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
- Ministry of Education, India