The Body Problem: Cautionary Notes on the Embodied Self

Abstract Recent years have seen a decisive turn in neuroscience toward embodiment, shifting focus from a brain-bound view of the mind to a more holistic one where the body is treated as constitutive of self and consciousness. While this turn has yielded valuable insights through studies on interoception, multisensory integration and bodily ownership, it also carries significant theoretical and ethical risks. This essay identifies the body problem: the risk of collapsing selfhood into bodyhood, with troubling consequences when applied to bodies that are marginalized or that otherwise do not meet the status quo. Tracing historical debates on mind–body relations, clarifying contemporary notions of the self and examining empirical findings on embodiment, it is argued that strong formulations of the embodied self risk reviving old reductions whereby “less body” implies “less self,” not because such formulations explicitly assert the inference, but because they leave it available for others to make. Such reductions threaten to undermine the value of persons whose bodies diverge from normative assumptions. Rather than rejecting embodiment research, this essay calls for caution against its uncritical extension, underscoring the need to guard against theoretical slippage that may entail harmful social consequences.