On Kant's Definition of Analogy

ABSTRACT In the Prolegomena , Kant offers his official definition of analogy in terms of the perfect similarity of the relations holding for completely dissimilar pairs. Although interpreters neglect to reconstruct Kant's views on similarity, they often cite the Prolegomena definition and take it to characterise analogy as the identity of two relations. As I show in the paper, this account is hermeneutically inaccurate and cannot do justice to Kant's claim according to which metaphysical judgements are meaningless unless they are interpreted against the background of some analogy. My aim is to offer an interpretation of Kant's definition of analogy with special regard to his conception of similarity. For Kant, I argue, an analogy subsists between four terms a, b, c, d iff the pairs < a, b > and <c, d> satisfy non‐identical relations and the latter exhibit the same (compatible) structural features—(non)/(a)symmetry, (non)/(a)transitivity, (ir)reflexivity. On this account, as I show, Kant's stance on the meaning of metaphysical judgements becomes clear, plausible and compatible with the examples of analogy he adduces.