Hardware-Enforced MAVLink Protocol Interposition: Stateful Header Inspection and Physics-Based Interdiction for UAS Cyber Defense
Unmanned aerial systems that rely on the MAVLink protocol are exposed to a class of unauthenticated-command vulnerabilities in which a compromised or spoofing sender reaches the flight controller and drives the actuators — demonstrated by 2026 CVEs in the two dominant open-source autopilots (CVE-2026-1579 in PX4; CVE-2026-38971 in ArduPilot; CVE-2026-32743). This paper presents the IM-1 Sovereign Node, an FPGA hardware interposer on the serial control path between the untrusted control plane and the trusted actuation plane. It performs stateful MAVLink header inspection (system-ID and sequence) at line rate and, on detecting an unauthorized or implausible command, applies a bounded physics-based interdiction of the actuator signal — preserving airframe controllability rather than dropping it — together with hardware-enforced domain isolation and a fail-open safety architecture. The approach is a hardware realization of runtime enforcement / shield synthesis at the actuation boundary, operating deterministically and independently of the software it protects. Verification is reported across unit (22/22), full-system integration (5/5), and live-traffic co-simulation. All results are simulation-based; silicon bring-up on the Artix-7 (Cmod A7) is the next milestone. Five U.S. provisional patents are on file (sole inventor).
Authors
- Aadarsh Neupane (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-6166-4232)
Institutions
- Texas State University (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-07-23
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21127173
- Primary Topic
- Air Traffic Management and Optimization
- Type
- preprint