Universalization of pro-honesty maxims and temptation to lie for a moral cause: the Kant-Rousseau Dilemma

Abstract Individuals universalize pro-honesty maxims that are social rankings of collective speech acts in order to discern whether they constitute categorical imperatives for honesty grounded in perfect duties. The intensity to follow universalized maxims are “occasionally tested” by the temptation to lie for purely consequential but moral concerns (imperfect duties). We apply this value-plural framework to Kant’s dilemma – “[t]he supposed right to lie” to save an innocent. When extended to two interactive decision makers (or players), Kant’s dilemma translates to Rousseau’s “Stag-Hunt.” The conflict between acting on imperatives for honesty (and fulfilling perfect duties) and sometimes bearing the cost of temptation to lie for a moral cause (to fulfill an imperfect duty) is modeled via a value theory that connects the two opposing ethical forces through a cardinal representation, yielding the Kant-Rousseau Dilemma game. We find that a greater temptation towards imperfect duties can counterintuitively raise the incidence of honesty and hurt the victim. Thus, in strategic social settings a paradox emerges wherein a stronger individual inclination to fulfill one’s imperfect duties increases the fraction of individuals who act to fulfill their perfect duties in that society! Second, a society with a smaller fraction of individuals fulfilling their perfect duty of honesty need not consist of individuals with a stronger intrinsic propensity to deceive. Interestingly, it may instead comprise individuals whose disposition towards dishonesty is weaker.