Identity Through Change: Aristotle Versus the Heracliteans in  <i>Metaphysics</i> Γ

Abstract In book Gamma of the Metaphysics Aristotle defends what is known as the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). He highlights how the proclivity of early thinkers to determine the nature or metaphysical identity of something according to sensation leads them to propose contradictions and ultimately deny PNC. This presocratic error can be aptly thought of as a kind of essentialism since the early philosophers generally assign the fundamental nature of a thing, what Aristotle would call essence, to its sensible properties. The paper focusses on what this error entails for the Heracliteans, arguing that the Heracliteans identify a thing as a static collection of properties – what Aristotle would call accidents. This leads to a metaphysics of change in which a subject in a state of change has no diachronic identity, contrasting with Aristotle’s replacement model of change in which a subject retains its essence through accidental change.