CEO–CFO tenure consistency and corporate fraud: moderating roles of CFO with audit experience and external monitoring

Purpose Amid rising corporate fraud incidents in emerging markets, driven by weak internal controls and executive opportunism, this study aims to explore the effect of CEO–CFO tenure consistency (CFTC) on corporate fraud (COF) and to examine whether CFO audit experience (CFAE) and Big 4 auditor oversight (B4N) moderate this relationship. Design/methodology/approach Using 15,192 firm-year observations from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011–2022, the authors apply a two-way fixed-effects regression with industry and year fixed effects to examine the influence of CFTC on COF. Alternative estimators, endogeneity tests and propensity-score matching are used as robustness tests. Findings This study’s results show that CFTC substantially reduces fraud likelihood, an influence that intensifies when CFAE and B4N supervision are present. Heterogeneity analyses reveal that the deterrent effect is most pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises, smaller entities and high-growth firms. The authors further identify two intervening mechanisms: (1) digital transformation raises transparency and data-driven controls, sharpening fraud detection, and (2) sustainable governance practices foster ethical conduct. Originality/value By linking executive-tenure alignment, specialized skills and external monitoring to fraud mitigation, this study extends governance theory and offers actionable insights for policymakers, regulators and practitioners in emerging markets.