Electoral clientelism as informal social protection in the 2023 Thai general election

Electoral clientelism is often interpreted as a consequence of socioeconomic vulnerability in unequal democracies. Yet it remains unclear whether reported compliance with vote buying is more closely associated with demographic disadvantage or with situational incorporation into exchange networks. This study examines clientelistic behavior in Thailand’s 2023 general election using nationally administered post-election survey data. Distinguishing structural indicators of vulnerability (education, age, gender, and residence) from direct exposure to inducements, the analysis constructs measures of exposure, behavioral reciprocity, and coercive justification, treating structural vulnerability and situational activation as analytically distinct but empirically interrelated mechanisms—potentially complementary, sequential, or interactive—rather than as mutually exclusive alternatives. The findings indicate that while exposure to vote buying remains a visible component of electoral competition, reported compliance is not independently associated with demographic characteristics once exposure is taken into account; reciprocal responsiveness is instead strongly correlated with reported incorporation into inducement-based exchange networks. Coercive items do not cohere into a single scale in these data, an observation interpreted with appropriate caution as reflective of measurement design as well as substantive patterns. Given the cross-sectional, individual-level design, the results are read as evidence of strong empirical associations rather than as causal estimates. The study contributes to debates on clientelism, informal social protection, and political incorporation in middle-income democracies, and situates the Thai case within a broader comparative literature spanning Southeast Asia, Latin America, and postcommunist Europe.