Does Broader Insurance Weaken Preventive Supply Chain Resilience? Moral Hazard, Verification, and the Limits of Visibility

This study examines whether broader supply chain insurance coverage is associated with lower preventive resilience investment through perceived managerial moral hazard. Drawing on moral hazard theory and supply chain resilience research, it tests a moderated-mediation model using survey data from 241 managers in manufacturing-intensive firms. PLS-SEM is used as the main estimator, and covariance-based SEM is reported as an estimator-sensitivity check. Results show that insurance coverage breadth is positively associated with moral hazard perceptions, moral hazard perceptions are negatively associated with preventive resilience investment, and preventive investment is negatively associated with perceived disruption impact. Moral hazard perceptions significantly mediate the coverage breadth–preventive investment relationship, while the direct effect is not significant. The total effect of insurance coverage breadth on preventive resilience investment is negative and significant. Firm-perceived insurer verification stringency is associated with a weaker coverage–moral hazard perception relationship, whereas supply chain visibility provides a smaller attenuation effect. Exploratory risk-type moderation is directional but inconclusive. This study offers evidence from an emerging-market manufacturing context and suggests that contractual verification may help preserve prevention incentives, without estimating causal treatment effects.