An Analysis of Yunus Emre’s Risāletü’n-Nushiyye from the Perspective of the Psychology Moral Values

Some poets attain a lasting place in collective memory through their works, independently of their historical and biographical affiliations. In such contexts, document-based biographical data recede into a secondary position, while the poet’s intellectual and spiritual identity is constructed primarily through his works. Holding a special position in the history of literature and Sufism, Yunus Emre emerges as a formative thinker and poet whose poetry influenced intellectual circles and broad segments of society. Risāletü’n-Nushiyye is a didactic advice treatise that addresses the obstacles encountered in moral and spiritual maturation and the possibilities of overcoming them. In this text, which has a history of nearly seven centuries, universal moral values rooted in Islamic thought are integrated with Yunus Emre’s personal experiences and transformed into a framework guiding individuals through spiritual difficulties. This article aims to identify the moral values found in Risāletü’n-Nushiyye, based on the Tatçı manuscript, and analyze these values within the frameworks of the values hierarchy and the Values in Action (VIA) classification. The study employed qualitative content analysis. Firstly, the dominant moral values in the text were systematically identified; secondly, these values were hierarchically categorized; finally, they were compared with the VIA classification developed by Peterson and Seligman. The findings show that self-discipline against idleness, contentment against greed, humility against arrogance, patience against anger, generosity against stinginess, and self-awareness against backbiting constitute the principal moral values in the work. The ultimate goal value appears as becoming a perfected human being, whereas reason emerges as the primary instrumental value. A substantial part of the identified values corresponds to VIA virtues and character strengths, such as humility, generosity, self-awareness, truthfulness, reason, spiritual maturation, and self-discipline. By contrast, contentment, patience, non-attachment to the world, personal moral accountability, and non-judgment of others do not have direct equivalents within the VIA framework; this reflects the distinctive ethical emphasis of the Islamic-Sufi moral tradition. The qualitative analyses reveal that Risāletü’n-Nushiyye may serve as a strong source for developing a universal moral values model. By examining the work’s ethical content within contemporary psychological frameworks, this article opens a new dialogue between psychology and the classical Islamic moral tradition. Thus, it makes an original, interdisciplinary, and methodological contribution to the literature.