Dynamic Defense Mechanism for Programmable Logic Controllers: A Heterogeneous Multi-Core Architecture with Rapid Nanosecond-Scale Threat Perception
Existing PLC security solutions face a fundamental conflict between stringent real-time requirements and robust protection: traditional IT security mechanisms (e.g., encryption, authentication) introduce unacceptable latency, while software-based redundancy schemes operate at millisecond scale and remain vulnerable to common-cause failures. To bridge this gap, this study proposes MimicPLC v1.0, a dynamic defense mechanism based on a heterogeneous multi-core architecture that integrates threat perception, dynamic fault tolerance, and rapid recovery within a single chip, thereby reconciling real-time determinism with proactive security in industrial control systems. The architecture integrates three distinct CPU cores (MIPS, ARM, and RISC-V) within a single system-on-chip (ESC0830), coordinated by a dedicated hardware-based mimic scheduling subsystem. This subsystem performs real-time, loosely coupled, transaction-level consistency checks on the AHB-Lite bus operations of the heterogeneous processors, achieving nanosecond-scale arbitration latency for threat detection. We evaluate the proposed design using an industrial-strength testbed, incorporating a custom development board and the Synopsys Verdi simulation environment, under critical attack scenarios including Denial-of-Service (DoS), replay, code injection, and parameter overwrite attacks. The system maintains continuous operation through adaptive redundancy, demonstrating attack perception within 73 clock cycles and leveraging instruction-set asymmetry for effective threat containment. Rigorous validation, including 100 consecutive parameter override attacks, confirms a 100% interception rate within our tested attack scenarios, with zero false positives observed. The design complies with the IEC 61131-3 real-time standard, exhibiting a worst-case recovery duration of 9.3 ms and a 95% confidence interval for recovery latency of [4.0354, 4.0363] ms. This work pioneers a paradigm of rapid-detection endogenous security with nanosecond-scale arbitration for next-generation industrial control systems.
Authors
- Delei Nie
- Jianmin Wu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0999-9194)
- Y Z Li
- Renhai Feng (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7194-6889)
- Jingjing Hu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3220-621X)
- Xin Wang
- Farrukh Hanif
Institutions
- Tianjin University (CN)
- Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area (CN)
- Purple Mountain Laboratories (CN)
- Southeast University (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Computation
- Published
- 2026-06-28
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.3390/computation14070149
- Primary Topic
- Security and Verification in Computing
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00