Evolutionary game modeling of collaborative innovation: the case of the Greater Eurasian Partnership

This study investigates the mechanisms and evolutionary dynamics of cross-border collaborative innovation under the Greater Eurasian Partnership framework, focusing on the strategic interactions among governments, Russian enterprises, and partner-country enterprises. While collaborative innovation between Russian enterprises, host governments, and enterprises in partner countries holds significant potential for enhancing Russia’s innovation capacity, advancing scientific frontiers, and fostering socioeconomic development, the interplay of multi-agent coordination—particularly the roles of governments, Russian enterprises, and partner-country enterprises—remains inadequately understood. This knowledge gap impedes the full realization of the GEP’s innovation potential. To address this, we develop a tripartite evolutionary game model involving governments, Russian enterprises, and partner-country enterprises. We integrate asymptotically stable equilibrium (ASE) analysis based on replicator dynamics and numerical simulations to elucidate the systemic dynamics and key determinants of collaborative innovation. The principal findings are as follows: (1) The decision-making behaviors of all three agents are interdependently influenced, exhibiting complex strategic interactions; (2) The system converges to an equilibrium state of active governmental support and bilateral enterprise collaboration when the payoffs of non-collaborative strategies fall below the joint returns from collaborative innovation, and governmental subsidies for collaboration outweigh the costs of passive engagement; (3) Increasing penalties for non-collaborative behaviors, enhancing risk-sharing mechanisms, and amplifying technological spillover effects significantly elevate the probability of collaborative strategy adoption. Theoretically, this study develops an evolutionary game-based analytical framework for understanding multi-agent collaborative innovation in transnational contexts. It proposes policy recommendations—including dynamic incentive-penalty mechanisms, risk-payoff alignment protocols, and cross-border intellectual property coordination—to inform the improvement of collaborative innovation governance within the Greater Eurasian Partnership framework.

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Publication Details

Journal
Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
Published
2026-06-26
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-08007-z
Primary Topic
Business Strategy and Innovation
Type
article
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article

Evolutionary game modeling of collaborative innovation: the case of the Greater Eurasian Partnership

Liang Zhao, YuHan Mei, Xiangying Ma
Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
Business Strategy and Innovation
article

Evolutionary game modeling of collaborative innovation: the case of the Greater Eurasian Partnership

Liang Zhao, YuHan Mei, Xiangying Ma
article en

Abstract

This study investigates the mechanisms and evolutionary dynamics of cross-border collaborative innovation under the Greater Eurasian Partnership framework, focusing on the strategic interactions among governments, Russian enterprises, and partner-country enterprises. While collaborative innovation between Russian enterprises, host governments, and enterprises in partner countries holds significant potential for enhancing Russia’s innovation capacity, advancing scientific frontiers, and fostering socioeconomic development, the interplay of multi-agent coordination—particularly the roles of governments, Russian enterprises, and partner-country enterprises—remains inadequately understood. This knowledge gap impedes the full realization of the GEP’s innovation potential. To address this, we develop a tripartite evolutionary game model involving governments, Russian enterprises, and partner-country enterprises. We integrate asymptotically stable equilibrium (ASE) analysis based on replicator dynamics and numerical simulations to elucidate the systemic dynamics and key determinants of collaborative innovation. The principal findings are as follows: (1) The decision-making behaviors of all three agents are interdependently influenced, exhibiting complex strategic interactions; (2) The system converges to an equilibrium state of active governmental support and bilateral enterprise collaboration when the payoffs of non-collaborative strategies fall below the joint returns from collaborative innovation, and governmental subsidies for collaboration outweigh the costs of passive engagement; (3) Increasing penalties for non-collaborative behaviors, enhancing risk-sharing mechanisms, and amplifying technological spillover effects significantly elevate the probability of collaborative strategy adoption. Theoretically, this study develops an evolutionary game-based analytical framework for understanding multi-agent collaborative innovation in transnational contexts. It proposes policy recommendations—including dynamic incentive-penalty mechanisms, risk-payoff alignment protocols, and cross-border intellectual property coordination—to inform the improvement of collaborative innovation governance within the Greater Eurasian Partnership framework.

Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
Harbin University of Science and Technology (CN), Liaoning University (CN), Soochow University (CN)
Partnerships for the goals
Openalex Percentile: Top 5%
Business Strategy and Innovation
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