The (beta-)decay of effective realism

Abstract The undeniable empirical success of the quantum field theories (QFTs) of the standard model of particle physics (SM) makes it tempting to articulate a scientific realist position duly localized to QFT. “Effective realism” has been widely discussed as a promising way to deliver a “selective” response to the pessimistic meta-induction that isolates and identifies the parts of our current theories likely to remain true of future physics. Effective realism may not be a single view, and its advocates acknowledge that it needs further development. I argue that one way to precisify effective realism—call it ER—is too stringent because its selective strategy for responding to the pessimistic meta-induction commits only to “renormalizable” QFTs, like the SM. To make my case, I introduce Fermi’s beta-decay theory, a non-renormalizable theory with an impressive empirical track record that is too compelling for a realist to ignore. I then argue that there’s no context-independent way to interpret non-renormalizable theories, so any overhaul of ER in response to my objection must grapple with practical considerations for both choosing an appropriate selective strategy and choosing suitable realist commitments once a selective strategy is in place. While these considerations aren’t incompatible with realism, they push ER sympathizers to clarify whether their view remains viable as a form of selective realism. The considerations I raise for the interpretive relevance of non-renormalizable theories also highlight that these neglected theories merit further philosophical attention and analysis.