Strong state, weak union, direct enforcement: labor governance under state corporatism and populist authoritarianism in China

Purpose Drawing on a mixed-method analysis of 173 labor disputes in China, this article identifies the staged effects and micro-mechanisms of state intervention in labor governance. Design/methodology/approach This study's variables are drawn primarily from textual sources collected through CLB's Trade Union Reform Map, including news reports and interviews with union officials. Following data collection, co-authors independently coded and analyzed the materials, resolving discrepancies through discussion to ensure reliability. The analysis employs descriptive statistics to examine key aspects of labor disputes, which include temporal, geographic and sectoral patterns, government intervention, union responsiveness, and dispute outcomes - while assessing union characteristics like bureaucratic tendencies, non-core task involvement, dispute-resolution capacity, and worker trust levels. To evaluate the relationship between government intervention and labor rights outcomes, we apply Baron and Kenny's mediation analysis framework. This approach tests whether government actions influence union effectiveness and worker protections through intermediary factors: bureaucratic characteristics, non-core tasks allocation, necessary ability, and mutual trust dynamics. All statistical analyses were performed by using Stata 17. Findings At the endpoint, direct local intervention significantly increases the likelihood that workers' demands are met; at the process stage, intervention suppresses unions' dispute-resolution capability, lowering their willingness and ability to act proactively. Non-core tasks crowd out organizational resources, while union–worker trust enhances awareness and mobilization; as independent mechanisms, both shape union performance. Originality/value We advance a capability-mediation perspective that elevates organizational capability from a control to a core explanatory mechanism and integrate state corporatism with populist authoritarianism within a single framework: highly visible direct enforcement yields immediate results and political returns but, through bureaucratic routines and non-core assignments, progressively hollows out union capacity and entrenches reliance on the direct state path.