Is Marya Schechtman’s ‘Person Life View’ A Conventionalist Account of Personal Identity?

Abstract This paper examines the parallels between Marya Schechtman’s (2014. Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life . Oxford: Oxford University Press) ‘Person Life View’ (PLV) and Conventionalism regarding personal identity. PLV contends that personal identity hinges on recognition by others and societal institutions, while Conventionalism argues that personhood is influenced by social conventions. Schechtman argues against Conventionalism and in favour of PLV on the grounds that changing conventions could undermine personhood. However, this paper argues that PLV is a form of Conventionalism. By analysing the roles of conventions, desires, and behaviours in both theories this paper demonstrates their fundamental similarities. In particular, PLV’s reliance on the notion of ‘acceptance into the person-space’ aligns with Conventionalism. Ultimately, this analysis suggests that Schechtman’s distinctions between her theory and Conventionalism may be artificial, showing how her criticism of Conventionalism is based on misunderstanding of the theory rather than genuine critiques.

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Publication Details

Journal
Metaphysica
Published
2026-06-25
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2025-0029
Primary Topic
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Is Marya Schechtman’s ‘Person Life View’ A Conventionalist Account of Personal Identity?

Conall Clarke
Metaphysica
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
article

Is Marya Schechtman’s ‘Person Life View’ A Conventionalist Account of Personal Identity?

Conall Clarke
article en

Abstract

Abstract This paper examines the parallels between Marya Schechtman’s (2014. Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life . Oxford: Oxford University Press) ‘Person Life View’ (PLV) and Conventionalism regarding personal identity. PLV contends that personal identity hinges on recognition by others and societal institutions, while Conventionalism argues that personhood is influenced by social conventions. Schechtman argues against Conventionalism and in favour of PLV on the grounds that changing conventions could undermine personhood. However, this paper argues that PLV is a form of Conventionalism. By analysing the roles of conventions, desires, and behaviours in both theories this paper demonstrates their fundamental similarities. In particular, PLV’s reliance on the notion of ‘acceptance into the person-space’ aligns with Conventionalism. Ultimately, this analysis suggests that Schechtman’s distinctions between her theory and Conventionalism may be artificial, showing how her criticism of Conventionalism is based on misunderstanding of the theory rather than genuine critiques.

Metaphysica
The University of Sydney (AU)
Australian Research Council
Reduced inequalities
Openalex Percentile: Top 2%
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
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