Corrupt But Functioning: Legal Brokerage in Indonesia’s Criminal Justice System

The practice of brokering legal cases involving both material and non-material exchanges with influential actors remains deeply entrenched despite over two decades of democratic law reforms in Indonesia. This persistence is often attributed to weak legal institutions and incompetent judicial actors, indicating a dysfunction stemming from an incomplete institutionalisation of the rule of law and uneven state development. This explanation, influenced by the Weberian approach, tends to idealise autonomous law as a historical endpoint for all societies while neglecting the underlying power dynamics and class conflicts that perpetuate the corrupt legal system. Employing a critical political economy perspective, this article argues that the persistence of legal brokerage underscores the nature of Indonesia’s political-legal order, wherein corruption is the norm rather than the exception. This corrupt legal system is an outcome of a distinct trajectory of capitalism that relies heavily on extra-economic mechanisms of accumulation, including the brokering of legal cases. Hence, instead of indicating an aberration, the brokerage ironically reflects a functioning legal order in Indonesia. This argument is substantiated through an analysis of notable instances of brokerage within the criminal justice system, highlighting the influences of non-legal aspects and powerful individuals in shaping judicial processes and outcomes.