Conditional loyalty: Partisanship and voter responses to corruption

To what extent does partisanship bias copartisans’ responses to corruption? While existing research shows that partisanship can shield politicians from the consequences of corruption, the conditions under which this varies remain unclear. I argue that partisanship’s effect on corruption voting depends on whether corruption is targeted (when the corrupt actor belongs to the voter’s preferred party) or systemic (when the electorate perceives corruption to be widespread). These contexts activate different processes: copartisan bias in candidate evaluation and the weakening of partisanship’s behavioral shielding effect. Using a survey experiment in Brazil and public opinion data from 17 Latin American countries (2008–2018), I find that copartisans express significantly greater support for a candidate accused of corruption when their party is implicated. However, as systemic corruption increases, they become less likely to support their party when it is in power and more likely to consider opposition alternatives. These findings show that copartisan bias in favor of accused politicians is conditional and can become fragile under certain circumstances.

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Publication Details

Journal
Electoral Studies
Published
2026-06-24
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2026.103108
Primary Topic
Corruption and Economic Development
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Conditional loyalty: Partisanship and voter responses to corruption

Laura Chelidonopoulos
Electoral Studies
Corruption and Economic Development
article

Conditional loyalty: Partisanship and voter responses to corruption

Laura Chelidonopoulos
article en

Abstract

To what extent does partisanship bias copartisans’ responses to corruption? While existing research shows that partisanship can shield politicians from the consequences of corruption, the conditions under which this varies remain unclear. I argue that partisanship’s effect on corruption voting depends on whether corruption is targeted (when the corrupt actor belongs to the voter’s preferred party) or systemic (when the electorate perceives corruption to be widespread). These contexts activate different processes: copartisan bias in candidate evaluation and the weakening of partisanship’s behavioral shielding effect. Using a survey experiment in Brazil and public opinion data from 17 Latin American countries (2008–2018), I find that copartisans express significantly greater support for a candidate accused of corruption when their party is implicated. However, as systemic corruption increases, they become less likely to support their party when it is in power and more likely to consider opposition alternatives. These findings show that copartisan bias in favor of accused politicians is conditional and can become fragile under certain circumstances.

Electoral StudiesVol. 102
University of Pittsburgh (US)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Corruption and Economic Development
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