Dialogue among divided nations: interactional resilience in inter-Korean and cross-strait relations

Why is sustained political dialogue possible between divided nations under unresolved sovereignty competition, and why do such mechanisms diverge over time? This article compares the only two contemporary cases meeting these scope conditions: inter-Korean and cross-Strait relations. It develops a configurational framework of interactional resilience, explaining divergent outcomes through three dimensions: the structural basis of peace, the motivational structure of dialogue, and two-level coupling between international shocks and domestic political competition. The inter-Korean configuration—punitive deterrence, weak non-military buffers, rent-oriented motivations, and tight regime-survival coupling—produces brittle resilience, leaving dialogue vulnerable to institutional negation. The cross-Strait configuration—denial-based deterrence, economic embeddedness, function-oriented motivations, and politicization buffered by constitutional-legal ambiguity and functional interdependence—produces frozen resilience, hollowing out dialogue while making abolition costly. The framework clarifies when dialogue becomes an object of hostility and distinguishes forms of non-functioning dialogue more precisely than conflict management or frozen conflict.