Quantifying the impact of stealthy attacks on IoT environments

The energy-efficient design of the BLE protocol, emphasis on rapid, and user-friendly discovery, making it an ideal choice for IoMTs, specifically, military field medical systems, and battlefield wearable sensors. Especially in active conflict zones, when static medical facilities are vulnerable and often targeted, limiting their viability for sustained care delivery. However, this rapid deployment, and ease of management comes at the cost of expanded attack surface, i.e., BLE flooding attacks. During such attacks, adversaries flood advertisement channels with unauthorized connection or advertising requests to exhaust nearby device resources and disrupt legitimate communication, sometimes culminating in denial-of-service conditions. A first public proof-of-concept of such attacks, using a Raspberry Pi has since been adapted to commodity platforms (e.g., Flipper Zero, HackRF, Android), lowering the barrier to attack. In contested environments, such platforms are directly relevant to adversarial RF jamming and spoofing operations, where low-cost, portable devices can induce disproportionate disruption in dense wireless ecosystems. In this work, we develop a quantitative foundation for understanding the impact of such attacks and propose a practical deterrence strategy based on agility to raise the cost of such attacks. Our main contributions include: (1) formalization of this problem as a finite resource stochastic system with dynamic adversarial capabilities under diverse scenarios (e.g., single/multiple & static/agile attackers), identifying bounds where disruption becomes likely. (2) We also synthesize agility parameters for adaptive deterrence that can lead to the development of actionable guidance for implementers and standards bodies (Bluetooth Interest Group) seeking to harden BLE stacks and preserve the reliability of dense IoT ecosystems. (3) Our third contribution is the cross-validation of our proposed stochastic model with a real-life testbed by implementing several attack scenarios. (4) Finally, we present a cross-layer defense architecture illustrating how future detection outputs and controller observations could be mapped to standards-supported BLE adaptations to neutralize BLE based threats.

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Publication Details

Journal
International Journal of Information Security
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-026-01348-5
Primary Topic
Bluetooth and Wireless Communication Technologies
Type
article
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article

Quantifying the impact of stealthy attacks on IoT environments

Fadi Mohsen, Adalynn Martinez, Usman Rauf
2 links
International Journal of Information Security
Bluetooth and Wireless Communication Technologies
article

Quantifying the impact of stealthy attacks on IoT environments

Fadi Mohsen, Adalynn Martinez, Usman Rauf
article en

Abstract

The energy-efficient design of the BLE protocol, emphasis on rapid, and user-friendly discovery, making it an ideal choice for IoMTs, specifically, military field medical systems, and battlefield wearable sensors. Especially in active conflict zones, when static medical facilities are vulnerable and often targeted, limiting their viability for sustained care delivery. However, this rapid deployment, and ease of management comes at the cost of expanded attack surface, i.e., BLE flooding attacks. During such attacks, adversaries flood advertisement channels with unauthorized connection or advertising requests to exhaust nearby device resources and disrupt legitimate communication, sometimes culminating in denial-of-service conditions. A first public proof-of-concept of such attacks, using a Raspberry Pi has since been adapted to commodity platforms (e.g., Flipper Zero, HackRF, Android), lowering the barrier to attack. In contested environments, such platforms are directly relevant to adversarial RF jamming and spoofing operations, where low-cost, portable devices can induce disproportionate disruption in dense wireless ecosystems. In this work, we develop a quantitative foundation for understanding the impact of such attacks and propose a practical deterrence strategy based on agility to raise the cost of such attacks. Our main contributions include: (1) formalization of this problem as a finite resource stochastic system with dynamic adversarial capabilities under diverse scenarios (e.g., single/multiple & static/agile attackers), identifying bounds where disruption becomes likely. (2) We also synthesize agility parameters for adaptive deterrence that can lead to the development of actionable guidance for implementers and standards bodies (Bluetooth Interest Group) seeking to harden BLE stacks and preserve the reliability of dense IoT ecosystems. (3) Our third contribution is the cross-validation of our proposed stochastic model with a real-life testbed by implementing several attack scenarios. (4) Finally, we present a cross-layer defense architecture illustrating how future detection outputs and controller observations could be mapped to standards-supported BLE adaptations to neutralize BLE based threats.

International Journal of Information SecurityVol. 25(6)
Mercy University (US), University of Groningen (NL)
Bluetooth and Wireless Communication Technologies
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