Ontkenning en gevangenisbeleid: Belgische en Engelse interacties met het Europees Comité voor de Preventie van Foltering en het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens

The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have played a central role in the development of human rights norms and prison standards within the Council of Europe level. Considerable research attention has been paid to the analysis of the legal framework set out in the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and the European Convention on Human Rights. Legal analysis of the CPT has primarily examined its mandate, working methods and standards, while scholarship on the ECtHR has mainly focused on the national implementation of judgements, without a particular emphasis on prison-related judgements. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in how European developments influence domestic penal policies. Despite the growing literature on the impact of the CPT and the ECtHR on national prison policies, relatively few studies explore the relational dynamics between these human rights institutions and state authorities regarding prison policy issues. The present study contributed to this emerging literature from a comparative perspective. Its objective was to understand how Belgian and English authorities have interacted with the CPT and the ECtHR over the years. In particular, it examined how the governments of Belgium and England respond to the CPT findings and recommendations and how they comply with the ECtHR judgements in relation to prison policy issues. These issues were investigated with specific attention to the dialogue between the states' authorities and these human rights institutions. For this purpose, an empirical qualitative document analysis was conducted of the CPT reports, states' reports, and ECtHR documents concerning the implementation of judgements. The states' interactions with the CPT and the ECtHR were discussed within the broader theoretical framework of ''states of denial'', as conceptualised by Stanley Cohen. From this perspective, this study identified the various forms of state denial used by Belgian and English authorities to avoid implementing CPT recommendations and ECtHR judgements. It further examined the extent of this denial in official interactions, as well as the factors that influence it. Regarding the CPT, denial in the dialogue between the states and the Committee on prison issues was long-lasting and prevalent. Overall, the document analysis showed that all forms of states of denial were present during these officials interactions. Although the degree of denial differed between the two countries, both contested the CPT findings, refused to act on its recommendations, and evaded responsibility for the prison problems highlighted by the Committee. One key factor influencing state responses was the specific area of prison policy involved. In particular, states showed greater denial towards CPT findings regarding discipline, conditions of detention, and prison regime. This indicates that when CPT recommendations touch upon politically sensitive topics driven by ideologies of punishment, state authorities are far more likely to resort to denial. Additionally, responses varied across states based on the type of CPT visit that led to the recommendations. While the Belgian authorities showed greater acceptance towards ad hoc visit reports, the English authorities responded with more denial. This variation could be explained by the fact that the CPT conducted fewer ad hoc visits in Belgium than in England. Therefore, the Committee should closely monitor state responses to ad hoc visit reports. The analysis also revealed that time plays an important role in shaping how states interact with the Committee. Longer drafting periods for CPT reports were correlated with slower response times from the states. Interestingly, delays in reporting had an impact on the content of the official responses. Specifically, longer response times correlated with acceptance from English authorities, but surprisingly led to denial from Belgian authorities. Despite this divergent response pattern, the findings demonstrate a clear need for both the Committee and state authorities to reduce their reporting timelines. To resolve these delays, a mandatory release procedure for CPT reports should be adopted, combined with close monitoring of the timely submission of states' reports. Regarding the implementation of ECtHR judgements, state denial was far more subtle. The study identified five compliance resistance indicators: execution delays, delays in paying the financial compensation, third-party interventions, interim resolutions and formal referrals of cases back to the Court by the Committee of Ministers (CoM). Both countries presented significant execution delays, with prison cases remaining pending for an average of five years. This failure of states to implement the Court's judgements in a timely manner hinder the effective protection of prisoners' rights, especially in cases of ongoing violations. Furthermore, while most payments were made on time across both countries, any delays that did occur were not only substantial, but also linked to prolonged implementation in the English cases. These findings indicate that time is a critical factor in state compliance. Consequently, the CoM should more rigorously monitor both pending cases with prolonged delays and delayed payment of financial compensation. While interim resolutions and formal referrals of cases back to the Court applied only to two English cases, their absence in the Belgian cases is likely due to the fact that the CoM rarely deploys these measures. Besides, the document analysis of the relevant action plans, reports, and communications revealed that all forms of states of denial were present during the official interactions with the CoM over the implementation of the examined prison cases. Although the extent of their denial varied, both the Belgian and the English authorities contested the implementation issues criticised by the CoM and avoided reporting concretely about future steps. These findings reflect the vital importance of closer monitoring of implementation progress, especially in cases requiring repeated action plans and reports. Finally, significant differences in state compliance emerged based on the gravity of the violations. Belgium implemented judgements faster for fundamental violations, whereas the opposite was true for England. Furthermore, while fundamental violations did not lead to a higher number of interim resolutions, they generated significantly more state action plans and reports. Moreover, the English authorities paid financial compensation uniformly, whereas Belgian authorities delayed payments primarily in fundamental cases. Similarly, third-party interventions occurred frequently in fundamental English cases but not in Belgian ones. These mixed results suggest that relying on a single universal standard to distinguish between violations may ne insufficient, highlighting the need for more tailored approached to monitoring state compliance.