Cultural Constraints on Regulation: The Influence of State Political Culture on the Quantity and Content of Bureaucratic Rules

Abstract Bureaucratic agencies hold enormous power to affect citizens’ lives through agency rulemaking. These rules hold the force of law, though the officials writing them do not serve in elected positions. Resulting concerns about bureaucratic policymaking have given rise to prolific literature on political control by executives and legislatures seeking to limit the opportunity for moral hazard. I contend that other factors may restrain rulemaking that do not arise directly from other government institutions. Specifically, I assess whether and how state political culture checks bureaucratic power by affecting the number and content of regulatory proposals. Using a large dataset containing the nearly 200,000 proposed regulations from agencies in every US state over a 10-year period, I test the degree to which states with varying cultures utilize bureaucratic rulemaking. I then evaluate whether culture impacts the topics covered by regulation using a subset of six states representing each cultural type. Findings suggest that agencies in traditionalistic states issue fewer regulations than those in moralistic or individualistic states, but proposed rules in individualistic states cover a broader range of policy areas. These results deepen our understanding of the factors influencing regulatory politics, expanding the universe of bureaucratic control beyond government institutions to the broader environment.