Platform service introduction and mode choice in co‐opetition with retailer: achieving win–win outcomes

Abstract Platforms, initially introducing services to attract online consumers, are increasingly providing omnichannel services to enhance offline retailers’ visibility and generate commission revenue. This paper constructs three game‐theoretic scenarios (no service, independent services, and omnichannel services) to investigate these impacts and identify the conditions for achieving win–win outcomes. Our findings reveal that the platform always prefers introducing services to gain a competitive advantage, although retailers benefit from services with high spillover effects. With omnichannel services, the commission mechanism motivates the platform to steer consumers toward the retailer. Concurrently, the retailer is willing to pay higher commissions to leverage this enhanced visibility and capture platform‐driven demand. Furthermore, consumer price reference behavior intensifies price competition, particularly when all consumers have access to both entities, making it more difficult for either to profit. Finally, we identify the Pareto improvement intervals, revealing that only the omnichannel service strategy leads to overall Pareto improvement.