The British Government, Nuclear Testing, and the Arms Race, 1961–1962

Abstract In 1961–2, when a three-year international moratorium on nuclear testing was broken by the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States agreed to resume testing in partnership: Britain would test underground at the American site in Nevada and the US would use the British site at Christmas Island for a new series of atmospheric tests. This article uses archival evidence to examine the British government’s position, showing that there was a great reluctance to resume testing and that, contrary to stereotypes, there was no strong lobbying for tests from the military or atomic scientists. While it was convenient to express the need for nuclear testing as a technical necessity, the requirement was fundamentally political: to support the United States. Meanwhile, Britain’s atomic scientists were working hard not only to test nuclear weapons but to ban testing, and the article also introduces the extensive scientific work done in support of nuclear test detection and arms-control verification. Although histories today emphasize the health and environmental impacts of nuclear testing, at the height of the Berlin crisis it was the nuclear arms race that worried politicians and scientists above all.

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Publication Details

Journal
The Historical Journal
Published
2026-06-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x26101642
Primary Topic
Nuclear Issues and Defense
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

The British Government, Nuclear Testing, and the Arms Race, 1961–1962

Richard Moore
The Historical Journal
Nuclear Issues and Defense
article

The British Government, Nuclear Testing, and the Arms Race, 1961–1962

Richard Moore
article en

Abstract

Abstract In 1961–2, when a three-year international moratorium on nuclear testing was broken by the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States agreed to resume testing in partnership: Britain would test underground at the American site in Nevada and the US would use the British site at Christmas Island for a new series of atmospheric tests. This article uses archival evidence to examine the British government’s position, showing that there was a great reluctance to resume testing and that, contrary to stereotypes, there was no strong lobbying for tests from the military or atomic scientists. While it was convenient to express the need for nuclear testing as a technical necessity, the requirement was fundamentally political: to support the United States. Meanwhile, Britain’s atomic scientists were working hard not only to test nuclear weapons but to ban testing, and the article also introduces the extensive scientific work done in support of nuclear test detection and arms-control verification. Although histories today emphasize the health and environmental impacts of nuclear testing, at the height of the Berlin crisis it was the nuclear arms race that worried politicians and scientists above all.

The Historical Journal
King's College London (GB)
Partnerships for the goals
Openalex Percentile: Top 3%
Nuclear Issues and Defense
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