Robust load frequency control with honeypot-based compensation and AETM under FDI attacks

This paper investigates the load frequency control (LFC) problem of power systems under actuator-side false data injection (FDI) attacks. First, an FDI-aware LFC model is developed to describe corruption in the control input channel. Subsequently, an adaptive event-triggered mechanism (AETM) is introduced to improve communication efficiency, and transmission lag is incorporated into the closed-loop model. Furthermore, a honeypot-gated adaptive compensation mechanism is proposed, where the honeypot detection flag activates the compensation channel and the estimated attack signal reduces the effective malicious component entering the actuator. Based on Lyapunov-Krasovskii functionals, sufficient LMI-based conditions are derived for stability analysis and controller synthesis with [Formula: see text] performance. Finally, simulation results under different attack scenarios show that the proposed method attenuates FDI-induced frequency regulation errors and reduces unnecessary event-triggered transmissions.