Rethinking Typological Functions: Toward a Structural Account of Typology and Intelligence

Contemporary interpretations of Jungian typological functions are often shaped by trait-based and cognitive or rationalist models. This paper argues that philosophical evaluation and reconstruction of typological theory are required. Drawing on distinctions from metaphysics—particularly between nominalism and realism and between bundle and substrate theories—this paper analyses how different interpretations of typological function are constructed and where their limitations arise. It shows that certain approaches collapse into nominalism by attributing shared features that do not obtain across their intended scope, while others fall into realist reification by treating functions as underlying entities. Even accounts that capture real patterns often remain bundle-like, describing co-occurring features without explaining reasons for their unity, or substrate-like, positing metaphysical identity where only structural similarity recurs. This account is further articulated through a structural analysis of signifying processes inspired by Lacanian theory, showing how functions can be understood as different modes of signifier chains. Applying the conceptual discussion to artificial intelligence, the paper argues that a clearer typological conception can inform how typology can better benefit artificial intelligence.