Civic Virtue and an Ethics of Genuine Concern

In this paper, I accept Talisse’s diagnosis regarding democracy’s ill health—that hyper-active citizenship can paradoxically subvert democracy—but I argue that withdrawal—or “civic solitude”—is an inadequate remedy. I propose a shift in our normative understanding of citizenship toward virtues of genuine concern for others. This model moves past civility as classically understood in the public reason literature and stresses individual moral virtues, specifically virtues of other-regard. Saving democracy requires transforming political engagement rather than abandoning it, however mindfully. Talisse’s account of civic solitude also fails to address the widespread issue of political apathy and lack of concern for the common good and our fellow citizens, which are independent of polarization, since we can be polarized and still worried about our society. Finally, it downplays the structural—non-individual-based—roots of polarization. In the face of these challenges, I argue for a synthesis of individual virtuous practice and collective institutional reform to save democracy.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Critical Review
Published
2026-06-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2026.2671541
Primary Topic
Political Philosophy and Ethics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Civic Virtue and an Ethics of Genuine Concern

Julia Maskivker
Critical Review
Political Philosophy and Ethics
article

Civic Virtue and an Ethics of Genuine Concern

Julia Maskivker
article en

Abstract

In this paper, I accept Talisse’s diagnosis regarding democracy’s ill health—that hyper-active citizenship can paradoxically subvert democracy—but I argue that withdrawal—or “civic solitude”—is an inadequate remedy. I propose a shift in our normative understanding of citizenship toward virtues of genuine concern for others. This model moves past civility as classically understood in the public reason literature and stresses individual moral virtues, specifically virtues of other-regard. Saving democracy requires transforming political engagement rather than abandoning it, however mindfully. Talisse’s account of civic solitude also fails to address the widespread issue of political apathy and lack of concern for the common good and our fellow citizens, which are independent of polarization, since we can be polarized and still worried about our society. Finally, it downplays the structural—non-individual-based—roots of polarization. In the face of these challenges, I argue for a synthesis of individual virtuous practice and collective institutional reform to save democracy.

Critical Review
Reduced inequalities
Openalex Percentile: Top 3%
Political Philosophy and Ethics
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