Hybrid ticket distribution in public transport: Profit thresholds and welfare divergence

Public transport ticket distribution increasingly combines operator-controlled channels with resellers, integrated ticketing systems, and Mobility-as-a-Service platforms. This paper develops an analytical framework to examine when intermediary participation becomes commercially attractive, how direct and intermediary channels should be organized once they coexist, and when provider and welfare rankings diverge. The model compares direct, reseller, decentralized hybrid, and coordinated platform distribution. It distinguishes intermediary-induced market expansion from channel overlap, distribution burdens, and retained provider revenues. Numerical illustrations evaluate the resulting analytical comparisons using illustrative parameter values motivated by public transport distribution arrangements. Whether to use an intermediary and how to organize the two channels are separate economic questions. In the reseller benchmark, intermediary participation becomes commercially attractive only once market expansion exceeds a provider-profit threshold. Once direct and intermediary channels coexist, the relative performance of decentralized and coordinated structures depends jointly on overlap, revenue retention, distribution burdens, and market expansion; neither hybrid arrangement yields higher provider profit for all admissible parameter values. Welfare and provider incentives need not coincide. In the reseller benchmark, the welfare threshold lies below the provider-profit threshold, creating a range in which intermediation raises total welfare while remaining commercially unattractive to the provider. In the hybrid comparisons, welfare increases for a wider range of admissible parameter values than provider profit does. Across the benchmark configurations, the welfare–provider wedge is mainly associated with passenger-surplus effects, while provider profit remains an important component of total welfare. The analysis shows that public transport distribution policy should distinguish intermediary participation from the organization of hybrid channels and assess profitability, total welfare, and the distribution of gains separately.

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Publication Details

Journal
Transportation Research Part A Policy and Practice
Published
2026-11-15
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2026.105330
Primary Topic
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Hybrid ticket distribution in public transport: Profit thresholds and welfare divergence

Harry Timmermans, Henk Meurs
1 links
Transportation Research Part A Policy and Practice
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
article

Hybrid ticket distribution in public transport: Profit thresholds and welfare divergence

Harry Timmermans, Henk Meurs
article en

Abstract

Public transport ticket distribution increasingly combines operator-controlled channels with resellers, integrated ticketing systems, and Mobility-as-a-Service platforms. This paper develops an analytical framework to examine when intermediary participation becomes commercially attractive, how direct and intermediary channels should be organized once they coexist, and when provider and welfare rankings diverge. The model compares direct, reseller, decentralized hybrid, and coordinated platform distribution. It distinguishes intermediary-induced market expansion from channel overlap, distribution burdens, and retained provider revenues. Numerical illustrations evaluate the resulting analytical comparisons using illustrative parameter values motivated by public transport distribution arrangements. Whether to use an intermediary and how to organize the two channels are separate economic questions. In the reseller benchmark, intermediary participation becomes commercially attractive only once market expansion exceeds a provider-profit threshold. Once direct and intermediary channels coexist, the relative performance of decentralized and coordinated structures depends jointly on overlap, revenue retention, distribution burdens, and market expansion; neither hybrid arrangement yields higher provider profit for all admissible parameter values. Welfare and provider incentives need not coincide. In the reseller benchmark, the welfare threshold lies below the provider-profit threshold, creating a range in which intermediation raises total welfare while remaining commercially unattractive to the provider. In the hybrid comparisons, welfare increases for a wider range of admissible parameter values than provider profit does. Across the benchmark configurations, the welfare–provider wedge is mainly associated with passenger-surplus effects, while provider profit remains an important component of total welfare. The analysis shows that public transport distribution policy should distinguish intermediary participation from the organization of hybrid channels and assess profitability, total welfare, and the distribution of gains separately.

Transportation Research Part A Policy and PracticeVol. 216
Radboud University Nijmegen (NL), Eindhoven University of Technology (NL)
Industry, innovation and infrastructure
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
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