Theories of Consciousness and the Selection Problem

Abstract Central parts of the debate between theories of consciousness concern the proposed mechanism rendering a previously unconscious state X conscious. Here, I introduce a question that comes immediately before, namely why it is X – rather than some other unconscious state Y – that gets to enter the mechanism and become conscious. This is the selection problem: accounting for the mechanism that selects which unconscious states are fed as input to a proposed consciousness-rendering mechanism. Given that there is a host of unconscious states (things I could experience next) that could enter the consciousness rendering mechanism, there is a line at the door, so to speak. Accounting for the selection mechanism involves clarifying the parameters under which the doorman operates. Doing this involves considering what are the factors involved in the selection process, where factors could e.g. be different kinds of properties. I briefly elaborate on such factors and give examples from different domains. Finally, I consider some implications and offer potential avenues of future research.