CEO Turnover and Corporate Cash Holdings: A Perspective on Precautionary and Agency Motives

This study examines the relationship between CEO turnover and corporate cash holdings through the lens of managerial cash retention motives, using data from firms listed on the Korea Exchange from 2014 to 2023. The findings indicate that CEO turnover is associated with a significant increase in cash holdings, particularly in firms facing heightened uncertainty and financial constraints, aligning with precautionary motives. This effect is also more pronounced in firms with weaker market monitoring, which is consistent with agency motives. Additional analyses show that both the precautionary and agency motives become more influential in non-chaebol firms, and in cases of forced turnover and external CEO appointments. Conversely, neither motive is significant in chaebol-affiliated firms, voluntary turnovers, or internal promotions. These findings suggest that the increase in cash holdings following CEO turnover is driven by the simultaneous operation of both motives under specific conditions.

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Publication Details

Journal
Korean Journal of Financial Studies
Published
2026-06-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.26845/kjfs.2026.4.55.3.165
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

CEO Turnover and Corporate Cash Holdings: A Perspective on Precautionary and Agency Motives

Huai Feng Wang, Hyung Chul Lee
Korean Journal of Financial Studies
Corporate Finance and Governance
article

CEO Turnover and Corporate Cash Holdings: A Perspective on Precautionary and Agency Motives

Huai Feng Wang, Hyung Chul Lee
article en

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between CEO turnover and corporate cash holdings through the lens of managerial cash retention motives, using data from firms listed on the Korea Exchange from 2014 to 2023. The findings indicate that CEO turnover is associated with a significant increase in cash holdings, particularly in firms facing heightened uncertainty and financial constraints, aligning with precautionary motives. This effect is also more pronounced in firms with weaker market monitoring, which is consistent with agency motives. Additional analyses show that both the precautionary and agency motives become more influential in non-chaebol firms, and in cases of forced turnover and external CEO appointments. Conversely, neither motive is significant in chaebol-affiliated firms, voluntary turnovers, or internal promotions. These findings suggest that the increase in cash holdings following CEO turnover is driven by the simultaneous operation of both motives under specific conditions.

Korean Journal of Financial StudiesVol. 55(3)
Chungbuk National University (KR)
Openalex Percentile: Top 3%
Corporate Finance and Governance
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CEO Turnover and Corporate Cash Holdings: A Perspective on Precautionary and Agency Motives — Huai Feng Wang, Hyung Chul Lee · Korean Journal of Financial Studies (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS