Electoral violence and struggle for power in post-war Iraq: evidence from a list experiment

Electoral violence poses a serious threat to democratic consolidation, particularly in post-conflict societies. While prior research has focused on the conditions under which such violence occurs, this study examines how ordinary citizens perceive and justify electoral violence. I conceptualize support for electoral violence as an instrumental response to distributional uncertainty, shaped by individuals’ exposure to risk and access to patronage networks. Drawing on original survey data from Iraq (2023), the study employs a list experiment to mitigate social desirability bias and estimate voter tolerance of violence. Results show that approximately 33% of Iraqis consider electoral violence against political rivals necessary. Support is highest among voters aligned with PMU-affiliated ruling parties and those embedded in patronage networks, while it is lower among individuals favoring rule-based governance. These findings suggest that electoral violence is tolerated as a means of protecting material and political interests. The study contributes to the literature by identifying the micro-foundations of violence tolerance and highlighting how patron-client dynamics shape democratic attitudes in post-conflict settings.