From Empathy to Empathesis: Conceptual Clarification and the Ethics of Understanding

Abstract This work presents a comprehensive conceptual analysis of empathy and introduces the neologism empathesis . It begins with a brief historical overview of the concept of empathy, whose definitions vary widely, ranging from emotional involvement to helping others. These differences are not a problem per se but, when unacknowledged or unanalysed, have often led to both theoretical and empirical confusion. Drawing on Edith Stein’s phenomenological perspective and Gilbert Ryle’s philosophy, we deepen the conceptual understanding of empathy. Following Stein, it is conceived as a primordial experience of perceiving another’s emotions and needs, even though the content (the other’s emotion itself) is non-primordial. This process involves imagining oneself in the place of the other. We use conceptual analysis to discuss the shortcomings of theories strongly grounded in processes of simulation and, especially, of inference. We argue that empathy is not a mental inference but an embodied, interactive experience that requires ethical openness and responsiveness. Finally, we analyse the use of the concept of empathy in ordinary language using the techniques proposed by John Wilson: paradigm case, counterexample, related concept, and borderline case. We conclude that clearer conceptual boundaries are needed and propose the neologism Empathesis to highlight the inseparability of empathy and understanding of the other. This unified concept emphasizes empathy as an active, ethical stance rather than a passive emotional response.