Agency mismatches limit the realised impact of water conservation measures
Abstract Water conservation is usually catalogued by technology – efficient fixtures, leak control, reuse, metering, process integration. That framing hides a stubborn fact: realised savings consistently fall short of engineering potential and often fade with time. Rebound, poor maintenance and behavioural decay explain part of the gap, but not all. A further share is an agency mismatch: the actor who would benefit from a measure lacks the authority, capacity and incentive to deploy it, while the actor who holds them does not benefit. That mismatch is not a new discovery – it is well documented in energy-efficiency and institutional-resource research – but it has not been systematically mapped for water conservation. Using the Scandinavian concept of rådighet (agency), separated here into capability (authority and capacity) and incentive alignment (motivation), I code water-conservation measures against the actors holding primary and secondary agency, and against how quickly each agency-holder can actually act. Clear patterns emerge: agency is concentrated for network measures and fragmented for building-scale ones; the largest potentials sit with the weakest-agency actors; concentrated agency and short latency rarely coincide outside the utility itself; and standards, pricing and digital infrastructure act as agency bridges. Two Swedish field trials illustrate why misaligned agency undermines otherwise sound technology, and the framework sets out what an agency-first approach means for policy.
Authors
- Jesper Knutsson (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1622-2009)
Institutions
- Chalmers University of Technology (SE)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Discover Environment
- Published
- 2026-11-17
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s44274-026-01209-x
- Primary Topic
- Water resources management and optimization
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00