The Return of the Nonhuman: The Reproduction of Anthropocentrism in Social Theory

Despite decades of critique, anthropocentrism continues to shape the conceptual foundations of social theory. While numerous approaches have sought to unsettle the human as the privileged locus of action, relevance, and meaning, less attention has been paid to the mundane conditions under which anthropocentric assumptions are practically reproduced in theoretical work itself. This article examines how anthropocentrism persists through recurring descriptive tendencies rather than through explicit theoretical commitments. Drawing on insights from science and technology studies, we analyse five descriptive tendencies through which anthropocentrism is routinely accomplished: the separation of worlds, the characterisation of entities, the assignment of abilities, the ordering of relations, and the attribution of agency. For such an important task, we need subtle reflexive attention to the ways in which discourse enacts and constrains foundational assumptions about entity and agency. Perhaps such steps can help us ‘rewright’ the nonhuman in social theory?