Difference Stripping Method (DSM): A Layered Framework of Minimal Constraints From Minimal Distinction to First-Person Irreplaceability

This paper proposes and systematically develops a novel method of conceptual analysis, the Difference Stripping Method (DSM), and employs it to construct a layered analytical framework consisting of four levels: the ontological level, the individual level, the stable-individual level, and the subject level. The central claim of this paper is that, when confronting certain fundamental questions, inquiry often begins by asking what a thing essentially is. However, when the object under investigation lacks a definition that can be commonly accepted, such an approach easily leads to theoretical circularity, conceptual confusion, and endless disputes between competing positions. DSM seeks to reverse this order of inquiry. Rather than asking what a concept is, DSM asks: What are the minimal conditions required for that concept to be possible at all? Accordingly, DSM does not attempt to answer the question “What is the world?” Instead, it investigates the minimal constraints that must be satisfied for any concept to be established. By progressively stripping away candidate conditions and examining whether the relevant concept undergoes functional collapse, DSM aims to identify the irreducible minimal constraints required for that concept to remain operative. Applying this method, the paper proposes a four-level analytical structure: • Ontological Level: Minimal Distinction• Individual Level: Definability• Stable-Individual Level: Historical Irreplaceability• Subject Level: First-Person Irreplaceability The paper further develops a twofold argument concerning the undiscussability of the Whole. At the pragmatic level, every act of assertion already introduces distinctions, thereby depriving the Whole of its wholeness. At the semantic level, the Whole remains open to both any predicate and its negation, preventing any description from imposing effective constraints upon it. From this, the paper argues that we cannot determine what existence ultimately is; we can only investigate the minimal requirements that existence must satisfy in order to enter discourse. The paper concludes that DSM is neither a substantive ontology nor a theory of the ultimate structure of reality. Rather, it is a methodological framework for identifying minimal constraints. What it offers is not a final answer, but a systematic path of inquiry that continually advances toward deeper levels of constraint.