Posigence, Negligence’s Positive Counterpart: An Empirical Investigation

Is there a positive counterpart to negligence? In the philosophical literature, there is a widespread asymmetry assumption according to which agents can be blameworthy for unwitting wrongdoing (negligence) but not praiseworthy for unwitting rightdoing. This project empirically examines what Daniel Telech has recently termed posigence: praiseworthiness for unwitting beneficial acts expressive of good quality of will. Across two studies, we found that people consistently judged agents whose unwitting actions or omissions were beneficial to be praiseworthy. In fact, posigent conduct was judged to be nearly as praiseworthy as deliberate rightdoing. Distracted agents, in contrast, were not judged to be praiseworthy. These findings challenge the assumption that praise requires intention, supporting Quality of Will theories over Kantian accounts.

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Publication Details

Journal
Philosophic exchange
Published
2026-10-05
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/29960126.2026.2737164
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Posigence, Negligence’s Positive Counterpart: An Empirical Investigation

Daniel Telech, Andrew J. Latham
1 citations
Philosophic exchange
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
article

Posigence, Negligence’s Positive Counterpart: An Empirical Investigation

Daniel Telech, Andrew J. Latham
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Is there a positive counterpart to negligence? In the philosophical literature, there is a widespread asymmetry assumption according to which agents can be blameworthy for unwitting wrongdoing (negligence) but not praiseworthy for unwitting rightdoing. This project empirically examines what Daniel Telech has recently termed posigence: praiseworthiness for unwitting beneficial acts expressive of good quality of will. Across two studies, we found that people consistently judged agents whose unwitting actions or omissions were beneficial to be praiseworthy. In fact, posigent conduct was judged to be nearly as praiseworthy as deliberate rightdoing. Distracted agents, in contrast, were not judged to be praiseworthy. These findings challenge the assumption that praise requires intention, supporting Quality of Will theories over Kantian accounts.

Philosophic exchange
The University of Melbourne (AU), University of the Fraser Valley (CA)
Openalex Percentile: Top 48%
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
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