The Causal Vacuum of Digital Fingerprints: A Physical-Layer Thermodynamic Framework for AGI-Scale Forgery Analysis
Release Positioning: This manuscript is an academic research preprint. It proposes a physical-layer thermodynamic framework for analyzing the "causal vacuum of digital fingerprints" under AGI-scale forgery scenarios. It does not constitute certification, procurement advice, legal judgment, compliance proof, product approval, or implementation instruction. Abstract: This study analyzes the physical blind spot of digital-fingerprint forgery at AGI scale. Its core contributions are threefold: Formalization: It formalizes digital-fingerprint forgery as a causal vacuum between “packet semantics” and “source-side physical history”. Physical Limits: It develops an analysis of conditional unforgeability, discussing the Landauer, Bennett, and Margolus-Levitin limits as an upper-bound thought experiment rather than an empirical attack-complexity lower bound for source-side history reconstruction. Verification Methodology: It proposes CV-Detect/SII/TGO and the Thermodynamic Controllability Ratio (MTC) as a candidate quantitative variable and a governance-risk mapping direction. Starting from thermodynamics and microwave physics, this work shifts the basis of verification from the computational-hardness assumptions of cryptography to the inviolability of physical laws. The paper connects hardware-level “physical receipts” to DORA and Article 15 of the EU AI Act as a research-oriented reinforcement direction for security networks in the AGI era. Companion Papers Statement: The present paper (V8.5) is positioned as a physical-layer information-theoretic deepening of the parent paper's security considerations, sharing common dimensional definitions of MTC with the theoretical companion (The Thermodynamic Debt Shifting Paradox) while remaining distinct from the adjacent engineering framework paper.
Authors
- Chin-Yu Hsu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0009-6267-7897)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-06-12
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20668661
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- preprint