Evolutionary game models to motivate cooperation in mandatory lane changing for bus exiting

To solve the social dilemma between buses and passenger cars in mandatory lane changing for bus exiting, the evolutionary game is utilized to analyze the interactions between them. Considering the similarity and randomness in decision-making, the replicator dynamic and stochastic evolutionary game models are formulated, respectively. Numerical simulation results indicate that the cooperative tendencies of buses are more obvious than those of passenger cars. The Nash equilibrium of changing lanes and giving way is promoted more effectively by reducing time losses of buses or increasing safety benefits of passenger cars associated with the strategy of cooperation. Specifically, reducing the arrival deceleration of passenger cars by 0.35 m/s² and decreasing the time loss of buses by 1.91 s stimulates the safe and efficient lane changing. The models proposed in this paper provide decent theoretical and practical support for intelligent decision-making in urban public transportation.