It is Not Just a Matter of Taste – it Makes Me Angry!

Abstract Many of the standard arguments for moral expressivism also seem to apply to the domain of taste. One standard argument turns on the apparent possibility of moral disagreement without any disagreement in belief. This suggests that moral disagreements and taste disagreements are best understood as disagreements in attitude. This presents the expressivist with a dilemma. Taste disagreements are paradigmatic examples of so-called faultless disagreements, whereas moral disagreements are not faultless. But if moral and taste judgments are attitudinal states, then the disagreement intuitions in the different domains should be uniform, which they are not. Eriksson (2016) argues that moral judgments are attitudinally more complex than taste judgments and that this explains the difference. Pietroiusti (2021) argues that Eriksson’s suggestion is unpersuasive. This paper develops and defends a view in the spirit of Eriksson’s suggestion against Pietroiusti’s arguments.