Functional Integrity Legislative Architecture: A Better Worst System v 47.1

Working drafts (v18, v30, v32) of A Better Worst System: Adversarial Governance Architecture — a proposal to replace the permanent legislature with randomly selected, single-task citizen panels that hear competing advocacy and dissolve upon voting. Core argument: institutional capture is an investment that requires a persistent target; per-task dissolution removes the target, and the writing of legislation is structurally separated from the voting on it. Drafts v18 and v30 are archived exactly as publicly posted (Substack, May–June 2026); v32 is the most recent working draft, archived prior to revision. Version 42.3.2 corrects an overbroad historical claim in earlier drafts that per-task dissolution distinguished this architecture from the sortition tradition. Terrill Bouricius's 2013 model is now identified only as one earlier example of a single-bill Policy Jury that votes and dissolves. I had not encountered Bouricius or the sortition literature during development. No claim is made that his work was an influence, source, closest analogue, or lineage for this architecture.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-08-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20639343
Primary Topic
Legal Language and Interpretation
Type
article
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article

Functional Integrity Legislative Architecture: A Better Worst System v 47.1

Henry Tuttle
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Legal Language and Interpretation
article

Functional Integrity Legislative Architecture: A Better Worst System v 47.1

Henry Tuttle
article en

Abstract

Working drafts (v18, v30, v32) of A Better Worst System: Adversarial Governance Architecture — a proposal to replace the permanent legislature with randomly selected, single-task citizen panels that hear competing advocacy and dissolve upon voting. Core argument: institutional capture is an investment that requires a persistent target; per-task dissolution removes the target, and the writing of legislation is structurally separated from the voting on it. Drafts v18 and v30 are archived exactly as publicly posted (Substack, May–June 2026); v32 is the most recent working draft, archived prior to revision. Version 42.3.2 corrects an overbroad historical claim in earlier drafts that per-task dissolution distinguished this architecture from the sortition tradition. Terrill Bouricius's 2013 model is now identified only as one earlier example of a single-bill Policy Jury that votes and dissolves. I had not encountered Bouricius or the sortition literature during development. No claim is made that his work was an influence, source, closest analogue, or lineage for this architecture.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 40%
Legal Language and Interpretation
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