Whistleblowing and the protection of EU financial interests: A comparative assessment of Italy, France and Ireland

Directive (EU) 2019/1937 establishes minimum standards for the protection of persons reporting breaches of EU law, including misconduct affecting the EU’s financial interests. Yet the Directive leaves Member States wide discretion in institutional design and enforcement architecture. This raises a constitutional question under Article 325 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): can whistleblowing serve as an effective instrument for protecting the EU’s financial interests when reporting systems remain institutionally diverse? Adopting a functional comparative methodology, this article examines the post-transposition regimes of Italy, France and Ireland across five dimensions: scope of protection, reporting channels, institutional arrangements, anti-retaliation safeguards and enforcement capacity. The analysis identifies three dominant regulatory logics: a centralised supervisory model (Italy), a compliance-oriented integrity model (France) and a labour protection rights and remedies model (Ireland). While baseline convergence in protective guarantees has been achieved, significant divergences persist in how disclosures are assessed, prioritised and transmitted into administrative and criminal enforcement pathways, including those involving the EU’s Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). Minimum harmonisation of safeguards is necessary, but insufficient on its own to secure the effectiveness requirement under Article 325 TFEU. Whistleblowing becomes a genuinely European instrument only where robust individual protection is complemented by institutional capacity ensuring timely triage, credible follow-up and coordinated escalation in cases affecting EU financial interests.