Principles of Institutional Design for a ‘Good’ Exit from Parliament: Representation, Welfare and Equality

How elected representatives depart the legislature, either voluntarily or involuntarily, shapes perceptions of the legitimacy of representative institutions. Yet parliamentary exit has been neglected in research on political careers. Seeking to address this gap, this article analyses parliamentary exit in terms of its fit with democratic values. It begins by recasting the process of exit as an ‘institution,’ which opens the door to institutionalist lines of inquiry including the main question we consider here: what principles should inform the design of parliamentary exit arrangements? We argue that the design of these structures should be rooted in the ideals of representation, qualified by the values of economic equality and individual welfare. Assessing various models of exit in these terms, we demonstrate the special merits of a model defined by moderately generous transition funding for departing MPs but tailored to their personal circumstances; generous and also tailored support in counselling and other forms of non-financial assistance; and highly restrictive lobbying regulations that prohibit MPs from engaging in lobbying activities following their departure from parliament. Democracies that set up parliamentary exit with care and reflection are more likely to avoid the many serious pathologies associated with the terminal stage of political careers.