Proportionate Sanctions? Balancing Effectiveness and Fundamental Rights before the CJEU

The European Union relies on restrictive measures and sanctions as one of its primary tools of foreign policy. These measures are intended to be targeted, effective, as well as proportionate. The general principle of proportionality is, in fact, one of the constitutional pillars of the Union, which aims to limit the scope and intensity of EU action. It requires that any decision made, including the imposition of restrictive measures, shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives pursued by the Union itself. In addition, the EU Charter further enshrines the key role of proportionality in regulating any limitation on the exercise of fundamental rights. In this legal framework, the principle of proportionality becomes a methodological imperative for the imposition of EU sanctions. Although the effectiveness of these decisions is essential for the credibility of the Union as a global actor and the advancement of the Council’s political agenda in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the pursuit of effectiveness is not unbound. The principle of proportionality represents a constitutional safeguard, limiting the Council’s discretion to impose excessive restrictions and unlawful interferences with the fundamental rights of targeted persons. By assessing the caselaw of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), this paper intends to shed light on the principle of proportionality in the judicial review of EU sanctions. It focuses on alleged breaches of the principle of proportionality raised before the Luxembourg judges, and presents how they review the legality of sanctions, balancing effectiveness with fundamental rights.