Experimental Evaluation of Spatial–Temporal Interference Mitigation in CRPA GNSS Receivers Under Jamming and Spoofing

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers remain highly vulnerable to intentional interference such as jamming and spoofing, necessitating robust mitigation strategies. This study presents a field-based experimental evaluation of interference suppression approaches in Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna (CRPA) systems, focusing on the comparative performance of conventional time-frequency domain techniques (adaptive notch filtering and pulse blanking) and advanced space-time adaptive processing (STAP). Two representative CRPA receivers were tested in vehicle-mounted experiments under sequential baseline, jamming, and spoofing conditions, with controlled interference generated using a HackRF One platform integrated with the GNSS-SDR. The performance assessment was based on logged GNSS, jammer, and RSSI data collected during 15 min vehicle-mounted dynamic trials, each consisting of 5 min baseline, 5 min jamming, and 5 min spoofing phases. While both approaches exhibited comparable performance under nominal conditions, significant differences emerged under spoofing. The time-frequency domain approach experienced severe degradation, including up to 90% satellite loss and HDOP values exceeding 100, whereas the STAP-based system maintained more than 95% satellite visibility and stable positioning with HDOP values below 1. These results indicate that the tested STAP-based CRPA configuration provided higher system-level stability than the time-frequency domain configuration under the evaluated interference conditions. The findings highlight the critical role of spatial–temporal processing in improving GNSS resilience and offer practical insights for the design of next-generation anti-jamming and anti-spoofing.