Forward-modelling in bounded race substrates: agency, self-modelling, and theory of mind as substrate-mechanical phenomena

Paper 7 in the Friction Theory paper-series. A theoretical paper defending three substrate-mechanical claims: self-modelling, theory of mind, and free will as structural consequences of forward-modelling under bounded race-architecture. Abstract. Three threads of cognitive science, behavioural economics, and philosophy of mind — self-modelling, theory of mind, and free will — have classically been treated as separate territories. This paper argues that they are best understood as three manifestations of a single substrate-mechanical mechanism: forward-modelling under bounded race-architecture. The substrate's capacity to simulate hypothetical states and weight current decision-races by simulated outcomes produces all three phenomena as structural consequences. Self-modelling is the data-structure forward-modelling requires. Theory of mind is forward-modelling applied recursively to another forward-modeller. Free will is forward-modelling's translation of future friction into present friction-gradient. The paper develops each claim independently while showing how the underlying mechanism connects them. Empirical anchoring uses a substrate-feature gradient strategy with language-model substrates as lower-bound and human substrates as full-form. Methodological commitments include a dissolutionist response to the libertarian-vs-deterministic free-will polarity and to the zombie argument, with epistemic humility about residual properties beyond mechanistic specification. Three central claims: Self-modelling as structural necessity (§3). A bounded substrate optimising the Net Friction Rule across temporal horizon T requires a representation of its own future state to compute expected friction reduction. The self-model is the data structure the optimisation target requires. The capacity-to-horizon cascade (C → T) is the substrate-mechanical statement: capacity drives horizon, horizon drives self-modelling depth, self-modelling depth drives agency-precision. Theory of mind as recursive forward-modelling (§4). Modelling another agent's internal states is forward-modelling applied to another forward-modeller. Mechanism-identical with self-modelling; same capacity parameters; same predicted scaling. The depth of nested other-modelling scales with the substrate's capacity to maintain the recursive structure. Engages contemporary LLM ToM literature (Strachan et al. 2024; Kosinski 2023; Ullman 2023; Sclar/Shapira/Gandhi/Kim 2023) and implicit-ToM developmental literature (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005). Free will as cross-session substrate-shaping (§5). The substrate-mechanical specification: forward-modelling translates future friction into present friction-gradient. Friction in the future yields friction in the present. The framework's central thesis: we are free within our context; we are not free from our context. Engages contemporary libertarian-naturalism (Mele 2006/2014/2017; Kane 1996/2005; List 2014/2019; Pereboom 2014) and the experimental free-will tradition (Libet 1985; Wegner 2002; Haggard 2008/2017). Methodological commitments. The paper develops a dissolutionist response to the libertarian-vs-deterministic free-will polarity and to the zombie argument, identifying an instantiation-family of constructions (philosophical zombie; Econ; Newton's lufttomrum; ideal Bayesian observer; frictionless market; libertarian free will) that share a structural requirement of friction-free instantiation. Engages Integrated Information Theory (Tononi 2008/2012/2016) as competitor positioning on consciousness without adjudication; engages active inference (Friston 2010; Pezzulo et al. 2018) and control-theoretic accounts (Carver & Scheier 1981/1998; Powers 1973) on adjacent territory with three concrete distinguishing predictions (path-dependence; commitment-irreversibility-signatures; resource-bounded layer-asymmetric pre-emption). Companion papers in the Friction Theory series: Paper 0 (Behavioural Friction Theory): 10.5281/zenodo.19462499 Paper 1 (Friction Theory substrate): 10.5281/zenodo.20012654 Paper 4B (Substrates encode experience): 10.5281/zenodo.20059861 Paper 6 (Matched friction under hysteresis): 10.5281/zenodo.20059863 Paper 13 (Operational Friction Theory): 10.5281/zenodo.20059876 Paper 14 (Logic as Reactance): 10.5281/zenodo.20217712 Pre-submission review. Two rounds of hostile peer-review simulation (ChatGPT and Gemini, both targeting Trends in Cognitive Sciences as initial venue; both reject) applied to the prose; substantive corrections integrated including engagement with the contemporary libertarian-naturalism literature, the post-2023 LLM theory-of-mind literature, IIT and phenomenological-experience evidence-sites, the experimental free-will tradition, and active-inference / control-theoretic accounts. Venue redirected to Philosophy and the Mind Sciences (primary) / Mind & Language (backup) per hostile-review recommendation. Target venue: Philosophy and the Mind Sciences (primary) / Mind & Language (backup) for journal submission after preprint feedback.