Willing but unable to pay? Gender, preferences, resources, and tax compliance

Abstract The existing literature shows that women are generally more likely than men to pay taxes. However, there is less consensus on gendered responses to interventions designed to boost compliance among non-payers, and the underlying mechanisms remain unclear. In this study, we exploit a field experiment designed to increase property tax compliance to investigate this gender disparity. Because female- and male-led households differ along many dimensions, including preferences, household structure, and economic resources, we interpret the female–male contrast as the joint product of these channels rather than the effect of gender alone. Within this framing, the cross-sectional baseline gap in compliance is descriptive, while the within-gender treatment effects of the experimental messages are causally identified by random assignment. Our findings confirm that taxpayers in female-led households are more diligent in paying taxes than those in male-led households at baseline. Notably, while receiving a deterrence letter encourages women to pay earlier, it does not increase their overall compliance; men, in contrast, show a marked improvement in overall compliance upon receiving the same letter. We also find that the size of the tax bill influences women’s compliance behavior (the likelihood of payment after treatment rises significantly for smaller tax bills) but has no similar effect on men. Survey data targeted at the same population suggest that, although women may be more motivated to pay (they perceive higher enforcement risk and exhibit higher tax morale) they also face tighter liquidity constraints, lower and less stable income, and a stronger perception that the tax is excessive. These patterns are consistent with a simple analytical model that links compliance to tax morale, risk aversion, and budget constraints, and in which liquidity-constrained taxpayers remain at a corner solution unresponsive to enforcement messages. The findings highlight how tax policies and enforcement procedures can exacerbate post-tax income inequality between genders, particularly in low-enforcement contexts where the tax base is weakly correlated with current income.