TELEOLOGY, UNITY, AND THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF NATURE FROM ARISTOTLE TO DESCARTES

This dissertation develops a unified account of teleological order and intelligibility across ancient and early modern philosophy. It argues that both Aristotle and Descartes, despite their differences, are committed to explaining how complex wholes—whether the cosmos or the human being—are structured by principles that render their parts intelligible within an ordered system. The first part defends a global interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology. Against views that restrict teleology to individual substances, it argues that Aristotle attributes to the cosmos a unified, organism-like order grounded in a “nature of the whole.” Drawing on his metaphysics, biology, and political theory, the dissertation shows that concepts such as suntaxis and bios support understanding the cosmos as a coordinated system whose parts are directed toward the good of the whole. The second part reinterprets Descartes’ account of sensation. It challenges the standard view that sensory experience remains marginal to Cartesian philosophy by arguing that sensation is intelligible within Descartes’ system when understood through the primitive notion of the mind-body union. Sensory perceptions arise from bodily processes but function to preserve and regulate the human composite, thereby belonging to a distinct domain of intelligibility. Taken together, these analyses reveal a shared philosophical concern: the integration of diverse parts into unified, intelligible wholes. Aristotle explains this unity through a global teleology of nature, while Descartes articulates it through the structure of the embodied mind. By situating both accounts within a broader framework of ordered intelligibility, this dissertation offers a new perspective on the continuity between ancient teleology and early modern philosophy.