STRONG-ARMING THE LAW: SECURITY AID'S IMPACT ON DEMOCRATIC OUTCOMES

This paper examines how the composition of foreign aid packages—specifically the mix of democracy aid and military aid—affects democratic outcomes in recipient states. I argue that donors facing instability in strategically important democratizing states fall into a "stabilization trap," increasing security assistance that undermines democracy aid. Drawing on data from 41 African states from 1996 to 2010 and an illustrative case study of Mali, my findings are consistent with the argument that democracy aid increases electoral democratic levels. The estimated moderating effect of military aid on democracy aid is more conditional: the negative interaction is statistically significant for general and governance-focused democracy aid but is not distinguishable from zero for norms-embedding aid. This suggests that military aid may not be associated with reduced effectiveness across all forms of democracy aid, but the association appears stronger for those that focus on the executive and need an accountable civilian apparatus.